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In this paper, we suggest a novel approach to program evaluation that allows identification of 
the causal effect of a training program on the likelihood of being invited to a job interview 
under weak assumptions. The idea is to measure the program-effects by pre- and post-
treatment data that are very close in time for the same individual. Our approach provides 
useful information on both, average effects of the program as well as information on the 
effects of the program for each individual. Evidence on individual treatment effects is helpful 
as it can be used to improve the targeting of programs. 
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1O /:t7CBPKt9C: 
!"e$ %e&'$ &o)*'+on$ 'o$ '"e$ e-.)*.'+on$ /0o%)e1$ )+e&$ +n$
+1/0o-+n2$'"e$3*.)+'4$o5$'"e$6.'.$on$7"+8"$e-.)*.'+on&$.0e$
8on6*8'e6$ .n6$ no'$ +n$ '"e$ 6e-e)o/1en'$ o5$ 5o01.)$
e8ono1e'0+8$1e'"o6&$'o$8+08*1-en'$+n.6e3*.'e$6.'.9$
(Heckman/Smith 1999, p. 3) 
 
There is no doubt that in the presence of tight government budgets credible policy evaluation 
is very important. There is also no doubt, however, that the evaluation of policy programs 
involves fundamental methodological difficulties. In this paper we suggest a new approach to 
the evaluation of labour market programs that relies on a novel experimental design and on 
self-collected data that help to identify the causal program effect under rather weak 
assumptions. 
We analyse the impact of participation in active labour market programs that are offered 
to unemployed individuals as part of the Swiss labour market policy. Since the second 
revision of the national unemployment insurance act in 1997, the unemployed are supposed to 
take an active part in improving their skills and job fitness. The different measures can be 
divided into three broad categories: training programs, public employment programs and 
wage subsidies.2 This paper focuses on a particular training program, which is meant to 
improve basic computer skills. These courses last between two and three weeks and teach 
basic word processing or spreadsheet calculation skills. Participating individuals receive a 
course certificate upon completion of the course. Enrolment in these programs is comparable 
in size to enrolment in other training programs, such as basic job search training, language 
courses and other vocational training. About one fourth of total expenditure on active and 
passive labour market policy measures is spent for training programs. 
Our procedure was as follows: First, we recruited unemployed persons who participated 
in the computer courses. Then we sent out applications for these people before they finished 
their course. A second wave of applications was sent after the participants had successfully 
completed the course and had received a certificate. The new applications were exactly the 
same as before with the only exception that this time the application also contained the course 
certificate. The impact of the program is measured by the firms’ responses. We check whether 
                                                
2 For details of the program see the evaluation studies by Gerfin and Lechner (2002) or Lalive, Van Ours, and 
Zweimüller (2001). 
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the probability to becoming invited for a job interview is different for the applications with 
certificate than for those without. 
The method we suggest in this paper has at least three major advantages compared to the 
existing techniques of policy evaluation. First, the pre-post comparison allows us to net out 
time-invariant individual characteristics. Due to the fact that we o%&e0-e$ /0e:$ .n6$ /o&'$
'0e.'1en'$o*'8o1e&$7+'"+n$.$/e0+o6$o5$.$ 5e7$7ee;&, we do not face the problem of varying 
labour market conditions that usually makes pre-/post comparisons problematic. The time 
proximity of treatment and control observations ensures that job chances of the individuals 
are not significantly different between treatment and control states. 
The second major advantage of our approach is that the .//)+8.'+on$ /0o8e&&$ +&$
e<o2eno*&$'o$'"e$/.0'+8+/.n'&9 The set-up of our experiment rules out any changes in search 
intensity and/or wage aspirations, because the researcher controls the application process. In 
previous studies it has been shown that the search intensity may be influenced negatively by 
course participation, which in turn produces a possible confound for the evaluation of the 
program (Calmfors, Forslund and Hemström, 2001). The same holds for changed reservation 
wages or aspiration levels in general. It may well be that participating in a policy measure 
raises the aspirations for a new job. 
The third major advantage is that our approach allows us to calculate +n6+-+6*.)$
'0e.'1en'$ e55e8'&. The majority of the datasets that are currently used in order to evaluate 
active labour market programs allow estimating only the average causal effect of a program 
for specific groups of individuals. Because we collect information on several treated and 
control applications per individual it is possible to address the important question of 
heterogeneity in the average causal effect for e.8"$+n6+-+6*.) who participates in the program. 
Thus, it is possible to study the distribution of the effects of the program across individuals. 
This information is critical in thinking about the political decisions leading to the 
implementation or the reform of an ALMP system (Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman, 2002). 
Moreover, knowing both individual treatment effects and individual characteristics of the 
participants (like sex, age, education record, unemployment record) allows to characterize 
those groups of individuals for whom program participation is beneficial, neutral or even 
counterproductive. This is of central importance for an optimal targeting of policies (Manski 
2000).  
According to our results, the probability of becoming invited to a job interview is, on$
.-e0.2e= negative but insignificant. There are, however, +1/o0'.n'$ +n6+-+6*.)$ 6+55e0en8e& 
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between the participants. While for some subjects course participation increases the number 
of invitations to a job interview, the opposite holds for other participants. This suggests that in 
designing and implementing policy measures appropriate targeting is crucial. Moreover, we 
find that the negative mean impact of the program can be assessed for vacancies that require 
good computer skills. This result is counterintuitive on first sight. A possible explanation, 
however, is that the participation in a very basic computer course may actually inform the 
hiring firm about the .%&en8e rather than about the presence of profound computer skills. 
In the next section we describe the procedure and the design of our study. Section 3 
reviews some of the related literature. In section 4 we summarize the main methodological 
advantages of the presented method. Section 5 discusses the identifying assumption and 
compares it to such assumptions invoked in cross-section observational studies. Section 6 
describes the data and contains results on the effect of computer courses on the probability of 
being invited to a job interview. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2O Res9S: C? tTe %tPBN 
Our study was designed to investigate the effect of computer courses on the chances to be 
invited to a job interview. These computer courses are part of the active labour market policy 
in Switzerland. They last for about two to three weeks and teach basic computer skills, e.g., 
the use of operating system software and an introduction to word processing or spreadsheet 
calculation programs.  
To recruit participants for our study we contacted various educational institutions that 
offer the courses and asked for the permission to recruit their course participants. We then 
went to the corresponding courses and informed the course participants about our study. This 
information included a short description of the aims of the study and all procedural details. 
Course participants were also informed that in case of participating in our study they were to 
receive a compensation of CHF 200 (∼US$ 120 or € 130). 
All individuals interested in participating in the experiment were individually invited to 
our institute for a first appointment. They had to bring their CV, copies of diplomas, other 
relevant certificates and letters of recommendation, i.e., all documents that are enclosed in a 
typical job application in Switzerland. Together with each participant we discussed what kind 
of jobs he or she usually applies to. Given the individual profile we searched for all potential 
vacancies in various newspapers and on the Internet. After having found about 10 vacancies 
for an applicant we prepared his or her job applications including a cover letter, the CV and 
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all documents about education and previous positions. Prior to sending the application to the 
corresponding firms, the applicant looked through all applications and signed them. This first 
set of applications was sent without any computer course certificate. 
When a participant had finished his or her course and had received the course certificate 
we prepared a second set of applications. These applications were e<.8')4$'"e$&.1e as before, 
with the only exception that now the just recently acquired basic computer skills were 
mentioned in the application letter and a copy of the relevant certificate(s) was included. 
Again the participant looked through the applications and signed them before they were sent 
to the firms. Appendix 3 displays an anonymous version of the cover letter and the course 
certificate of a treated application as well as the cover letter of a control application. 
The participants in our study had to keep track of all firm responses. To standardize this 
information, participants were given a form where they had to indicate, e.g., the firm’s name 
they had applied to, the date at which the firm reacted and whether the firm wished an 
interview or not. In case a participant received an invitation, it was at the participant’s 
discretion to accept the interview or to deny it. After the participant sent us the completed 
form the person was paid the CHF 200. Most firms that received an application letter usually 
answered within a period of three weeks.3   
Together with the applicant’s CV and the completed forms we have the following data: 
(i) The firm’s response (wishes an interview, wishes no interview, wants further information, 
no response after three weeks), (ii) individual characteristics of the applicant, (iii) the firm’s 
job advertisement (including special requirements for applicant, like computer or language 
skills, blue collar or white collar job, firm’s name and type of industry/sector, size of the 
advertisement in the newspaper, hours of work, the date we sent the application to the firm), 
and (iv) the date the firm contacted the applicant. 
 
3O 3e<;teB .9te7;tP7e  
Our design is similar to the so-called ‘correspondence testing’ method. According to the 
latter, matched pairs of applicants apply for a job. The two applicants differ only with respect 
to a treatment variable like sex or race. The researcher checks, whether the invitations of the 
two persons differ and takes this as evidence for a treatment effect. These studies have been 
conducted to study discrimination issues, such as racial discrimination (e.g., Firth 1981, Riach 
                                                
3 In case it took longer we told the participant to stop waiting and to send us the completed form without those 
firms. 
 6
and Rich 1991), sex discrimination (e.g., Neumark 1996, Riach and Rich 1995, 
Weichselbaumer 2002) and unemployment stigma (Oberholzer-Gee 2000). To our knowledge 
no such type of study has yet been applied to program evaluation. 
Our procedure differs from the correspondence testing approach in two important ways. 
First, we do not send matched pairs of applicants to firms. There is only one application per 
person to a particular job. Instead, we send applications of the &.1e person with and without a 
basic computer course certificate to 6+55e0en' jobs. This allows perfect control for individual 
characteristics that is missing in the studies mentioned above. While these studies put much 
effort in keeping the two applicants as similar as possible (except for the characteristic of 
interest), they are of course not completely alike. This has given rise to criticism. In his 
related critique of audit studies, Heckman (1998) notes, e.g., that the chances that all 
characteristics that might affect productivity are perfectly matched are rather low (p. 108).  
The second important difference to the existing correspondence-testing studies is that 
our study involves no fake or deception whatsoever. In the previous studies known to us there 
is a varying degree of deception involved. It is, e.g., common practice to completely fake the 
applicants, i.e., the applicants do not exist at all. In our view this procedure is problematic for 
various reasons. Most importantly, there is a substantial lack of control. You can never be 
sure that firms detect deception (e.g., if they try to contact the applicant or a former 
employer). Moreover, deception makes it impossible to write complete applications. In many 
European countries, and in Switzerland in particular, a meaningful application includes the 
complete listing of jobs (with the names of former employers and their letters of 
recommendation) and a detailed record of education (including copies of school and diploma 
degrees). By using fictitious persons it is not possible to provide all this information in a legal 
and credible way. A further objection against deception rests on the fact that it imposes a cost 
on employers who take their time evaluating applications of employees who do not exist. Our 
study avoids deception. We had only real participants who were actually looking for jobs and 
who provided us with real documents and biographies. 
There is a related empirical literature based on e1/)o4e0$ &*0-e4& that investigates 
differences in employer hiring by program participation status for Sweden (Agell and 
Lundborg, 1995 and 1999, Behrenz, 1998). A second strand of the empirical literature is 
concerned with employer hiring behavior and the matching of firms and workers in general, 
i.e., making no distinction with respect to program participation status (Albrecht and Van 
Ours (2002), Gorter et al. (1993), Lindeboom et al. (1994), and Van Ours and Ridder (1992)). 
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These studies are based on job vacancy data usually provided by the public employment 
service. 
 
4O 5etTCBC<CS9K;< ;BA;:t;Ses 
As mentioned above, the three major virtues of our study concern (i) the time proximity of the 
pre- and post-observations; (ii) the exogeneity of the search process; and (iii) the possibility to 
calculate individual treatment effects. We will now discuss these three advantages in detail. 
 
4O1 T98eLW7CX989tN C? W7eLWCst CIse7A;t9C:s  
As Heckman and Smith (1997) have put it, the “essence of the evaluation problem is that the 
same person cannot be in two or more different market states at the same time. In the training 
context, for each trainee, there is a hypothetical (or counterfactual) state that consists of what 
he or she would have done without training.” (p. 40). With the usually available data it is very 
difficult to construct a ‘counterfactual’ state, i.e., to find an appropriate control group for the 
treated one. Even with the help of sophisticated econometrics, this control is always 
imperfect. The method presented in this study comes closer to the ideal of constructing a 
‘counterfactual’ state by collecting more appropriate data. 
Our design allows us to estimate – for the &.1e person – the probability to get a job 
interview with and without training. This pre-post comparison does not suffer from the usual 
problem with such comparisons that labour market conditions may differ before and after the 
treatment. In our design the duration between the first application (without a computer course 
certificate) and the last application (with the computer course certificate) was about 5 weeks 
and the average time difference between control and treatment observations was about 
3 weeks. We managed to keep this period short because we started the application phase for 
the untreated application usually when individuals were close to finish the course. It is very 
unlikely that significant changes in the individuals’ labour market prospects take place within 
such short periods of time. Yet, the time span is long enough to guarantee that there were 
sufficiently many jobs for both the control and the treatment phase of the application process.  
Furthermore, applications with and without computer course certificate are exactly the 
same. Firms are provided with the same CV, the same application letter and the same letters 
of recommendation. Thus, they have the &.1e information on the characteristics that affect 
productivity. The only difference between the applications of the treated and the non-treated 
concerns the information that the applicant has been trained in a computer course. To our 
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knowledge, no other type of study (based on administrative data, correspondence testing or 
audits) guarantees this perfect individual control. 
As a consequence our study does not suffer from the problem that pre-post comparisons 
usually are confronted with. As long as there are no systematic differences in the quality of 
the jobs the individual applies to with and without the certificate the outcome of applications 
without the computer course certificate(s) mimics the counterfactual very closely.4 Note that 
there are several observations on job applications per individual, with and without the 
computer course certificate; and that the selection of the applications was under the control of 
the experimenter. 
Besides its merits, our method does not guarantee perfect control with respect to the jobs 
that participants apply to. Since the same person applies with and without certificate, perfect 
control for job heterogeneity is impossible. The latter would imply that we send two 
applications of the same person to the same firm, an obviously meaningless procedure. 
However, since we know the job advertisements we have information on job characteristics 
and the firms that offer the jobs. We will control for this observable heterogeneity.  
 
4O2 $XCSe:e9tN C? tTe se;7KT W7CKess  
The second major advantage of our set-up is that we control for &e.08"$+n'en&+'4. This control 
is important since program participation is time consuming and therefore search intensity may 
be lower (the so-called “locking-in effect of ALMP”). As a consequence, participation in a 
policy measure may in fact increase the duration of unemployment (Lalive, Van Ours and 
Zweimüller, 2001). This effect is ruled out in our design. First, the application intensity is 
completely exogenous to the program participant, since the researchers did the job search and 
wrote the application letters. Second, we ;no7 the frequency of applications with and without 
computer course certificate. Even if there was a difference in the number of applications (with 
and without treatment) we know the difference and can easily control for it. Therefore, we can 
safely rule out a possible confound which is due to differences in search activities. 
Moreover, we control for .&/+0.'+on$ )e-e)&9 Participation in a policy measure may not 
only improve human capital but also aspiration levels. The first effect is obvious and is 
exactly the reason why the policy measure is implemented at all: People are supposed to learn 
and to improve their skills in a dimension that is relevant for employment. At the same time, 
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however, course participation might change aspiration levels and reservation wages. In 
particular, it might happen that people will have higher aspiration levels or higher reservation 
wages after completing the computer course than before starting the course.5 As a 
consequence, it may be that previous participants do no longer apply to jobs for which they 
would have applied for in case of non-participation. This effect cannot be controlled for in 
usually available data. The present method, however, does control for this effect. On the one 
hand, the application process is exogenous. On the other hand, no subject refused to sign a 
suggested application. 
 
4O3 /:B9A9BP;< t7e;t8e:t e??eKts  
One of the virtues of our research design is the possibility to calculate individual treatment 
effects. Heckman et al. (1999) review a number of European programs with estimated mean 
impacts not significantly different from zero or even negative. This does not necessarily 
imply, however, that there is a common negative effect on all individuals. It can also be that 
programs have different impacts for each individual. If this holds, it is interesting and 
important to know the entire distribution of the treatment effects. First, knowledge of the 
distribution of treatment effects is essential in addressing questions such as “For what 
percentage of the treated individuals is the effect positive? How many participants are doing 
worse because they attended the program?” These questions arise in the context of a thorough 
analysis of the benefits of any program. They are also important for the public support of 
these programs. Second, it is important to know who exactly benefits from a program in order 
to target existing policies to those who benefit most. Third, individuals may be reluctant to 
sign up for training courses due to bad prior experience with further education. Informing 
these individuals of the likely impacts on their employment prospects is important. 
Existing data allow identification of the average effect of treatment on the treated 
conditional on observed characteristics such as age or gender, for instance. Our approach 
allows identifying the average effect of the treatment 5o0$e.8"$+n6+-+6*.). Thus, it is possible 
                                                                                                                                                   
4 To make sure that the vacancies were of comparable quality before and after the treatment we sampled only 
vacancies that had been opened within the last week. The actual submission of the application was somewhat 
later, on average one week after the vacancy was opened. 
5 Korpi (1997) shows that ALMP participants indicate a higher subjective well-being than the openly 
unemployed who do not attend such a program. If subjective well-being is taken as a proxy for utility attached to 
the labour market status of being a program participant, this evidence suggests that program participants may be 
more demanding with respect to the quality of a job in the regular labour market compared to employed who are 
not participating in a program. This will decrease the likelihood that a job offer will be accepted by a program 
participant. It is in this sense that ALMPs may decrease the likelihood of accepting a regular job. 
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to address the question to what extent the causal effect of the program -.0+e& within cells 
defined by observable characteristics.  
It is very difficult to identify individual treatment effects in existing datasets because 
most datasets do not contain repeated observations per individual.6 To side-step this missing 
data problem, existing studies addressing the issue of impact heterogeneity invoke non-
testable assumptions concerning the structure of the econometric model (Aakvik et al. 2000; 
Carneiro et al., 2002). The approach proposed in this paper identifies the effect of computer 
course participation for each individual because several observations with and without the 
computer course certificate are available. Thus, it is possible to estimate the entire distribution 
of the treatment impacts across individuals. This allows addressing the issue whether 
treatment effects are constant or whether impacts vary across the population. 
 
5O /Be:t9?9K;t9C: 
This section addresses the issue under which assumptions our study identifies the causal 
effect of a computer course certificate on the probability of being invited to a job interview. 
We also highlight to what extent the present study might be superior to existing approaches in 
evaluating the causal effect of ALMPs on a particular outcome. 
In the following we discuss identification using the model of potential outcomes due to 
Roy (1951) and Rubin (1974).Define by Y1 the random variable taking the value 1 if a job 
application 8on'.+n+n2$ '"e$ 8o1/*'e0$ 8o*0&e$ 8e0'+5+8.'e leads to an invitation to a job 
interview; let Y1 take the value 0 otherwise. We refer to Y1 as the ‘outcome with treatment’. 
Similarly, define by Y0 the ‘outcome without treatment’, i.e., the random variable taking the 
value 1 if an application no'$8on'.+n+n2$'"e$8o1/*'e0$8o*0&e$8e0'+5+8.'e$leads to an invitation 
to a job interview. Finally, let D equal 1 if the job application actually does contain the 
computer course certificate, and 0 otherwise. The data is informative on Y=DY1+(1-D)Y0, 
which corresponds to the outcome with treatment for applications containing the course 
certificate (Y=Y1 iff D=1), and the outcome without treatment for applications not containing 
the course certificate (Y=Y0 iff D=0). This paper is concerned with estimating the effect of a 
computer course certificate on applications that do contain such a certificate (for the 
individuals who agreed to participate in the present study), or  
)1|1Pr()1|1Pr()1|( 0101 ==−====−=∆ >?>?>??@  (1) 
                                                
6 Bergemann et al. (2000) is an exception. 
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This is the change in the probability of being invited to a job interview due to the 
computer course certificate, the so-called ‘effect of treatment on the treated’.7 The 
fundamental problem of causal inference is that we do not observe the last quantity in the 
previous formula, the probability of ‘success’ in case there has been no mention of the course 
certificate (Holland, 1986). 
However, it is possible to estimate this quantity subject to identifying assumptions. Let 
xI refer to all characteristics of the individual that play a role in firms’ hiring decisions. These 
are, for instance, the level of education, the quality of the job application letter, previous work 
experience of the job seeker, etc. Let xJ denote all characteristics of the job offer that are 
observable to individuals who are looking for a new job such as type of skill required, size of 
the advertisement, working hours, industry of the hiring firm, etc. The identifying assumption 
underlying this study is  
0,| ?<<> AB ⊥       (2) 
This so-called conditional independence assumption (CIA) asserts that, conditional on 
the identity of the job seeker as well as observable characteristics of the job offers, an 
application letter containing the computer course certificate (D=1) must be independent of the 
probability of invitation (Y0). This assumption is justified, intuitively, if there are no 
unobservables that, simultaneously, determine the presence of a computer course certificate 
and the probability of an invitation. 
CIA implies that the counterfactual outcome, the probability of invitation for treated job 
applications in the case there has been no computer course certificate, is identical to the 
corresponding probability for the job applications with no course certificate, i.e., 
)0,,|1Pr()1,,|1Pr( 00 ===== ><<?><<? ABAB  (3) 
Thus, the effect of the computer course certificate on the probability of invitation is 
identified using the probability of invitation for those applications not containing the 
certificate as an estimate of the counterfactual. The effect of treatment on the treated (1) is 
then the mean (over the characteristics xI and xJ) of the effect of treatment on the treated ones 
with particular values of xI, xJ (3) in the population of those with treatment (D=1). 
∫ ===−==∆ )1|,()0,,|1Pr()1|Pr( 01 ><<6C><<?>? ABAB  (4) 
                                                
7 This effect is useful in analyzing whether a program is successful for those who participate in the program. See 
Heckman et al. (1999) for an definition of different treatment effects and different objectives when pursuing an 
evaluation study. 
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We can now state the methodological advantages of the present study compared to a 
typical cross-section study more formally. CIA is more convincing in this study for at least 
two reasons: C+0&', because there is no$-.0+.'+on$+n$8".0.8'e0+&'+8&$o5$'"e$Do%$.//)+8.'+on at the 
individual level (xI) it necessarily follows that there are no unobservable characteristics at the 
individual level that might determine, simultaneously, the decision of the researcher to 
include the computer course certificate in the application letter (D), as well as the decision of 
the firm on extending an invitation to a particular job seeker (Y0).8 To fix ideas, let there be 
just one type of job offer (so xJ is constant). In that case there can be no differences in terms 
of match quality across treatment status. Moreover, because no characteristics of the job 
application letter are altered in response to treatment, there can be no effect of the quality of 
the job application on the probability of invitation. This implies that due to the design of this 
study, applications containing the information that the job seeker has undergone basic 
computer training must have the same probability of invitation as the corresponding 
applications that contain no information on course participation. Treatment status is 
independent of the potential ‘non-treatment outcome’ conditional on the identity of the 
individual job seeker. In studies that rely on cross-sectional data at the level of the job seeker, 
the above-mentioned conclusion does not follow. It is possible and likely that the researcher 
does not observe an aspect of the job application letter which is important in firms’ selection 
decision as well as determining the decision to either enroll into training or to disclose 
information on course participation. If this is the case, the CIA assumption is violated, 
because the outcome is correlated with the treatment status of a job application.  
Ee8on6, in this design the allocation of job offers to the treatment was entirely under the 
control of the researcher, as pointed out in the previous section. Thus, the assumption that 
there are no remaining unobservables at the level of the job application that determine the 
treatment status of an application as well as the probability of an invitation is, arguably, 
justified. Recall that the data contains information on all characteristics of a job offer that can 
potentially be observed (in the newspaper or in the Internet) and that are relevant in selecting 
job offers. 
Existing evaluation studies based on cross-section data at the level of the individual 
contain only little if any information at the level of the vacancy. This implies that it is not 
possible to condition on the type of vacancy in the evaluation. The consequence is that it is 
                                                
8 Recall that all aspects of the job application letter were held constant across treatment status. 
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not possible to discuss the causal effect of training on the probability of invitation to a job 
interview.9 
CIA is, arguably, valid in this application because the treatment status was decided upon 
by the researcher, because there was no variation in observable characteristics conditional on 
the identity of the job seeker, and because the data is informative on all characteristics which 
were relevant in assigning job applications to treatment status. 
  
6O 3esP<ts 
In this section we describe the dataset, report estimates referring to the effect of basic 
computer course certificates on the chances of getting a job interview and investigate the 
heterogeneity in the effect of computer programs along two dimensions: skills required on the 
new job and individual background of the job seeker. 
 
6O1 R;t;  
The study was conducted from December 1999 until March 2000. In total, 10 individuals 
participated in the study. A total of 191 job applications was sent out, 95 without computer 
course certificate, 96 with computer course certificate. On average, we sent out the treated 
application 21 days after sending out the control application. Thus, in principle both 
applications could have been sent to the same position. It was ensured that the time span 
between the date of publishing and the date of sending out the application was not more than 
one week. 
The data contains detailed information on the type of job offer. The first type of 
information refers to skills required on the vacancy: computer skills, knowledge of a second 
language and ability to work in a team. These three variables were coded as dummy variables, 
taking the value 1 if the job offer mentions the item and 0 otherwise. Second, a distinction 
was made between white-collar jobs and blue collar jobs. Third, there is information on the 
industry of the firm seeking to hire (government, retail, and other services are the largest three 
industries), hours of work (as a share of a full time job), the size of the job advertisement in 
the newspaper (in cm2), and the date when the vacancy was published. The last characteristic 
                                                
9 Instead, such studies identify the causal effect of training on invitations .n6 on the process of finding suitable 
job offer. Of course, this effect may be of interest. However, in discussing the effects of skill enhancement on 
labour market success, this combined effect is not informative. If it is the case that training improves the process 
of finding job offers instead of enhancing computer skills, one might think about sending job seekers to 
programs aiming at improving job search skills instead of computer skills.  
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is important because all treated applications were sent out later than the control applications. 
These characteristics are the set of observables xI used in this study.  
With respect to individuals, the data are informative on education, age, sex, previous 
work history, quality of the application, etc. As the data contain repeated observations for 
each individual, both in the treated and in the non-treated state, it is possible to account for 
such individual differences by way of person effects. 
The dependent variable is whether an application letter leads to an invitation within 
three weeks after sending out the job application. We find that 83 % of the firms responded 
within this time period - evidence that the response period was chosen sufficiently long. Note 
that the fraction of missing responses was identical across treatment status. The variable 
“invitations to a job interview” is coded as a dummy taking the value 1 if the hiring firm 
invites the job seeker, and 0 otherwise. Note that the 0-outcome refers to the response that the 
firm does not wish an interview (76 % of all zero entries), the firm wants further information 
(4 %), and no response on the part of the hiring firm (20 %).  
 
6O2O $??eKt C? T7e;t8e:t C: tTe T7e;teB 
The choice of the appropriate estimation strategy was guided by the trade-off between bias 
and variance. Non-parametric estimators, such as the method of matching, have the advantage 
– compared to parametric approaches – that no assumptions beyond CIA stated in (2) need to 
be invoked. This implies that the bias due to misspecification of the econometric model is 
reduced. However, it is well known that non-parametric estimators are biased in small 
samples. Moreover, non-parametric estimators are characterized by a slow speed of 
convergence to the asymptotic distribution. Considering the fact that the number of job 
applications in this study is small, we report estimates based on a parametric estimator.10 
The dependent variable, invitations to a job interview, is a binary variable. This variable 
can be analysed using either a logit or a probit model. However, these maximum-likelihood 
based methods require knowledge about the distribution of the error term, and rely on large 
samples as far as the consistency and asymptotic distribution is concerned. A potentially 
attractive alternative to the logit / probit approach is the linear probability model. This model 
assumes that the probability of an invitation to a job interview can be approximated by a 
linear function of the explanatory variables. The use of the linear probability model has been 
justified in the literature in case the focus of research is the estimation of the effect of an 
                                                
10 See Heckman et al. (1998) for a discussion of the matching estimator. 
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explanatory variable on the change in the probability of a non-zero realisation of the 
dependent variable (Moffit, 1999).  
The main advantage of the linear probability model is that there is no need to assume a 
specific functional form for the error term. Objections against the linear probability model 
include that it may produce fitted values outside the zero-one range, and that errors are 
heteroskedastic.11 The first concern cannot be accounted for. Nevertheless, it is true that the 
linear probability model performs quite well near the sample average of the dependent 
variable. Heteroskedastic errors can be addressed in different ways. We report bootstrap 
standard errors that are robust to the presence of heteroskedastic errors.12 Note that a popular 
alternative approach to address heteroskedasticity involves the White (1980) estimator of 
variance. This method is likely to lead to unsatisfactory results since this method is valid only 
for large samples. Table A1 in Appendix 1 contains complete results with White standard 
errors. 
Table 1 reports results regarding the effect of a computer course certificate on the 
probability of invitation to a job interview based on a linear probability model. All estimates 
control for individual effects and the observed characteristics of the vacancy mentioned in the 
previous subsection. Column A reports an estimate of the effect of treatment on the treated 
based on the assumption that the effect of the course certificate neither differs by individual 
nor by type of job offer.  
According to the estimate in Column A, the effect of the computer course certificate on 
the success of job applications was negative but not significantly different from zero. The 
point estimate suggests a reduction of the probability of being invited for a job interview by 
3.3 % if a computer course certificate is added to the application. However, the result in 
Column A may be biased because the underlying assumption is that the treatment effect is 
constant across individuals and jobs. Therefore, it is important to relax this assumption.  
                                                
11 Aldrich and Nelson (1984) analyze the properties of the linear probability model in detail. 
12 We perform a bootstrap on the sample observations. This method has been shown to be robust to 
heteroskedasticity and it is the appropriate method to use in the presence of random explanatory variables. 
Clearly, these conditions are both fulfilled in the present application. See Maddala and Jeong (1993) and Efron 
(1993) for a discussion of bootstrap methods and their applications.  
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T;I<e 1O TTe e??eKt C? ; KC8WPte7 KCP7se Ke7t9?9K;te C: 9:A9t;t9C:s tC ; [CI 9:te7A9eF 
ReWe:Be:t A;79;I<e1 -7CI;I9<9tN C? Ie9:S 9:A9teB tC ; [CI 9:te7A9eF 
 A B C D 
Average effect of treatment on the treated -.033   -.052 
 (.061)   (.094) 
Average effect of treatment for vacancies 
that  
… do not mention computer skills 
 
.043 
 
 
  (.068)   
… do mention computer skills a)   -.195   
  (.095)**   
Average effect of treatment for      
Individual 1   -0.178  
   (0.122)  
Individual 9   -0.157  
   (0.250)  
Individual 5   -0.131  
   (0.125)  
Individual 4   -0.122  
   (0.123)  
Individual 7   -0.057  
   (0.077)  
Individual 6   -0.056  
   (0.082)  
Individual 3   -0.051  
   (0.234)  
Individual 2   0.011  
   (0.093)  
Individual 10   0.198  
   (0.171)  
Individual 8   0.233  
   (0.224)  
Observations 191 191 191 191 
Adjusted R-squared 0.25 0.27 0.25 0.24 
Notes:      Bootstrap standard error in parentheses (based on 1000 repetitions), see Table A1 for White 
standard errors (which are not valid in small samples).  
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.  
See Table A1 in Appendix 1 for results on other variables (computer skills, second 
language, team skills, date vacancy was published, size, work hours, skill level, position, 
industry, and 10 individual effects). 
A: Assumes constant treatment effect. 
B: Allows for heterogeneity of the treatment effect with respect to “computer skills” only. 
C: Allows for heterogeneity of the treatment effect with respect to individuals. 
D: Allows for full heterogeneity of the treatment effect with respect to all variables. 
a) Measured relative to “job does not mention computer literacy”. 
Source:    Own calculation, own survey data. 
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6O3O $??eKt Tete7CSe:e9tN1 \'C8WPte7 [CIs] ;:B 9:B9A9BP;< Tete7CSe:e9tN 
Columns B and C in Table 1 report results allowing for differences in the estimated effect of 
computer courses along two important dimensions. First, we allow for separate treatment 
effects for vacancies that do or do not require ‘computer skills’ (column B). Second, we allow 
for different treatment effects at the individual level (column C) 
The estimates in column B suggest that the effect of computer training on jobs that do 
not require computer skills is slightly positive but insignificant. Interestingly the effect for 
jobs that do require computer skills is significantly lower than the effect for jobs that do not 
require computer skills: The ‘invitation probability’ drops by 19.5 % if job seekers disclose 
information on the recent completion of a basic computer.  
While this result appears puzzling at first, a potential explanation may focus on the fact 
that certificates actually confer two separate and opposing types of information. The first type 
of information refers to the new skill acquired and is likely to increase invitations. The second 
type of information is that the job seeker does not have prior work experience with the 
computer and that therefore the level of computer education is in fact rather low. This 
information may have a negative impact on the success of job applications. It is plausible that 
for some jobs, the first, positive effect dominates whereas for other types of jobs the second, 
negative effect dominates. The negative effect will, for instance, dominate in the case of 
vacancies stating computer skills as a requirement to do the job.13  
Column C explores differences in the effect of computer courses along the individual 
dimension. Specifically, we report separate effects of computer training programs for each 
individual. This is possible because the data contain repeated information on invitations for 
each individual in each treatment state. Results suggest that there is tremendous variation in 
the point estimates of the individual treatment effects. The estimated effects of computer 
training on the chances of getting a job interview range from a reduction by 17.8 % 
(Individual 1) to an improvement by 23.3 % (Individual 8), covering a range of 41.1 %.14 
These results suggest that targeting of the treatment is critical. In a next step, it may be useful 
to relate these individual treatment effects to further information at the individual level.  
It is interesting to see whether computer training did benefit those who already had a 
rather high probability of being invited without such training. Figure 1 displays the scatter 
                                                
13 This finding is consistent with job market signaling theories (Spence, 1973) and recent evidence on the role of 
formal education in job market signaling (Albrecht and Van Ours, 2002). 
14 This difference is at the border of statistical significance at the 10 % level with a bootstrap standard error of 
25.8 %. 
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plot of the estimated treatment effect against the baseline probability of being invited to a job 
interview across individuals.15 Figure 1 suggests that basic computer training is the least 
ineffective for the individuals who are below the average probability of invitation.16 Again, 
this is consistent with a signalling explanation. The computer course certificate confers the 
least negative information for those individuals with an a priori weak labour market position. 
 
)9SP7e 1O RCes KC8WPte7 t7;9:9:S Ie:e?9t tTCse [CI see=e7s F9tT ; T9ST I;se<9:e 
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Both sensitivity analyses document that heterogeneity in the effect of computer training 
courses on invitations to a job interview is important. Column D in Table 1 therefore reports 
the estimated average effect of treatment on the treated based on a linear probability model 
allowing for heterogeneity in the treatment effect along .))$o%&e0-e6$6+1en&+on&. This means 
that the treatment indicator is interacted with all observed characteristics of the vacancy as 
well as with the 10 person effects. The effect displayed in the table is the product of these 
separate treatment effects with the average of the characteristic in the sample with treatment. 
This is an estimator of the population effect of treatment on the treated defined in (4) (see 
Appendix 2 for an exact description of the procedure used).  
                                                
15 Both estimates are deviations from the respective sample means (-3.1 % for the treatment effect, and 26.3 % 
for the person effect). 
16 The correlation between the estimated treatment effect and the estimated person effect is 0.01 with and –0.61 
without individual 8 (the ‘outlier’ in the upper right corner of Figure 1). 
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The results suggest that the effect of training on labour market success is negative but 
insignificant. The estimated average effect of treatment on the treated individuals is slightly 
smaller than the effect reported in Column A, but the difference is neither statistically 
significant nor quantitatively important.17 This means that, in the present context, 
heterogeneity in the treatment effect does not bias results based on a model assuming 
homogeneous treatment effects. 
 
7O 'C:K<Ps9C: 
The main difficulty in the evaluation of social programs is to obtain credible estimates for the 
‘counterfactual’, i.e., information for participants on the outcome in the state of non-
participation. A meaningful indicator for the success of active labour market policies is the 
probability of being invited to a job interview. This measure can be observed both during and 
after the program for participants. Thus, the effect of the program on invitations is identified 
under weak assumptions 5o0$e-e04$+n6+-+6*.). 
The present study has shown that this data collection procedure is operational. 
Moreover, we find that this approach is useful when discussing heterogeneous treatment 
impacts. If program impacts are heterogeneous, it is important to find out who benefits most 
from the program in order to target the program. The approach suggested in the paper 
provides the information needed in order to target the program. 
We find that the average effect of a computer training program in Switzerland on 
invitations to a job interview is negative but insignificant. Looking at individual treatment 
effects we see quite variance in outcomes: there are both individuals who benefit and those 
who do actually worse after program participation. An improvement in the targeting of the 
program seems important. 
                                                
17 Note, that allowing for heterogeneous treatment effects does not improve the fit of the model as indicated by 
the reduction in the adjusted R2 from .25 to .24. 
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T;I<e ,1O Ret;9<eB 7esP<ts ?C7 T;I<e 1 
Dependent variable: Invitations to a job interview 
 A B C D 
Treated -0.033 0.043   
 (0.047) (0.061)   
Treated * pc skills  -0.195  -0.141 
  (0.093)**  (0.113) 
Treated * pd1a)   -0.178 -0.361 
   (0.121) (0.360) 
Treated * pd2   0.011 -0.113 
   (0.083) (0.344) 
Treated * pd3   -0.051 0.100 
   (0.200) (0.349) 
Treated * pd4   -0.122 0.103 
   (0.066)* (0.338) 
Treated * pd5   -0.131 0.429 
   (0.066)** (0.445) 
Treated * pd6   -0.056 0.372 
   (0.051) (0.322) 
Treated * pd7   -0.057 0.376 
   (0.058) (0.402) 
Treated * pd8   0.233 0.500 
   (0.200) (0.419) 
Treated * pd9   -0.157 0.082 
   (0.219) (0.378) 
Treated * pd10   0.198 0.541 
   (0.153) (0.361) 
Treated * language skills    0.146 
    (0.142) 
Treated * team skills    0.028 
    (0.122) 
Treated * Date of publicationb) 
(weeks since mean publication date)    -0.040 
    (0.031) 
Treated * size of vacancy in newspaper (cm2 / 100)    -0.104 
    (0.073) 
Treated * hours (share of full time)    0.230 
    (0.504) 
Treated * white collar positionc)    -0.018 
    (0.235) 
Treated * government    -0.208 
    (0.182) 
Treated * retail    -0.210 
    (0.190) 
Treated * other services    -0.025 
    (0.196) 
Computer skills -0.082 0.013 -0.100 -0.039 
 (0.050) (0.069) (0.054)* (0.075) 
Language skills 0.112 0.093 0.111 0.015 
 (0.071) (0.069) (0.074) (0.107) 
Team skills 0.076 0.081 0.095 0.093 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.057) (0.101) 
(Continued on next page)     
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Table A1 (continued)     
Date of publication 
(weeks since mean publication date) 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.010 
 (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
Size of vacancy in newspaper (cm2 / 100) -0.025 -0.023 -0.040 0.011 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.037) (0.054) 
Hours (share of full time) -0.123 -0.159 -0.187 -0.350 
 (0.179) (0.182) (0.184) (0.467) 
White collar position -0.204 -0.194 -0.233 -0.227 
 (0.098)** (0.100)* (0.112)** (0.170) 
Government -0.009 -0.020 -0.011 0.109 
 (0.098) (0.098) (0.107) (0.129) 
Retail 0.042 0.022 0.034 0.141 
 (0.100) (0.101) (0.105) (0.133) 
Other Services 0.051 0.057 0.081 0.108 
 (0.101) (0.101) (0.111) (0.139) 
Pd2d) -0.106 -0.123 -0.221 -0.240 
 (0.061)* (0.062)* (0.112)** (0.122)* 
Pd3 -0.140 -0.155 -0.229 -0.243 
 (0.087) (0.089)* (0.149) (0.172) 
Pd4 -0.203 -0.209 -0.215 -0.264 
 (0.097)** (0.100)** (0.121)* (0.137)* 
Pd5 -0.488 -0.488 -0.554 -0.595 
 (0.125)*** (0.126)*** (0.161)*** (0.220)*** 
Pd6 -0.421 -0.396 -0.499 -0.600 
 (0.119)*** (0.122)*** (0.164)*** (0.236)** 
Pd7 -0.266 -0.270 -0.329 -0.453 
 (0.095)*** (0.095)*** (0.137)** (0.191)** 
Pd8 0.367 0.393 0.223 0.182 
 (0.146)** (0.146)*** (0.199) (0.222) 
Pd9 0.111 0.086 0.065 -0.029 
 (0.121) (0.119) (0.175) (0.210) 
Pd10 -0.380 -0.360 -0.610 -0.600 
 (0.141)*** (0.142)** (0.185)*** (0.255)** 
Constant 0.392 0.358 0.500 0.511 
 (0.158)** (0.158)** (0.187)*** (0.266)* 
Observations 191 191 191 191 
Adjusted R-squared 0.25 0.27 0.25 0.24 
White standard errors in parentheses. Table 1 in the main text reports bootstrap standard errors. 
*** is significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
a) Pd1: Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the observation refers to Individual 1. 
b) ‘Other industries’ is reference. 
c) Size, date published, hours are deviations from the sample mean. 
d) Note that the person dummies measure the difference of the invitation probability of this person to person 
1 because this dummy was left out (for ease of interpretation). 
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This section describes the two step procedure used to estimate the average effect of treatment 
on the treated, defined in (1), allowing for separate effects on all observable dimensions 
(Table 1, Column D). The first step is a simple regression of the invitation indicator yj on (i) 
interactions of the treatment indicator Dj with all observables of the job offer xj and with all 
person dummies aj, and (ii) on the xj and aj directly. The notation aj refers to the person 
dummy of the individual to whom application j belongs, and j indexes job offers. The 
regression thus reads 
D
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D;;<D .<>.><4 εββδδ ++++= ∑∑∑∑ ,,,,,,,,  
where ; indexes the different observable characteristics (such as computer skills, or hours of 
work, etc.) and ) indexes the individuals, and runs, therefore, from 1 to 10.  
In the second step, the average effect of treatment on the treated is estimated. Recall that this 
effect is defined in the population as 
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An estimate of E(Y1|xj,aj,D=1) is  
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where ^ denotes the OLS estimator. If CIA holds, E(Y0|xj,aj,D=1) can be estimated by  
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It follows that the average effect of treatment on the treated in (A1) is  
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where I(.) is the indicator function, and the over bar on the second line in (A2) indicates 
“mean for applications with treatment”. In words, the estimated average effect of treatment on 
the treated is the product of the estimated treatment coefficients with the mean of the 
characteristics of the application. 
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The standard error for this quantity was estimated by bootstrapping according to the following 
procedure 
1. select at random, with replacement, 191 observations on yj, xj, and aj, 
2. calculate the quantity in (A1) 
3. repeat this process 1000 times. 
the standard deviation of the resulting 1000 estimates of the treatment effect ( +∆ˆ ) was 
calculated according to the formula 
11000
))ˆ(ˆ(
)ˆ(
2
1000
1
−
∆−∆
=∆
∑
=
+
+
+ 1e.n
&6  
This type of bootstrap allows for heteroskedasticity (Maddala and Jeong, 1993).  
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,WWe:B9X 3 
,WW<9K;t9C: <ette7 2/T#(&T KCP7se Ke7t9?9K;te  
_bKC:t7C< ;WW<9K;t9C:c t7;:s<;teB ?7C8 4e78;:` 
 
"Address of individual0 
 
"Address of firm0 
 
 
"2ate0 
 
! #o% tit(e * 
 
2ear "Personnel department0 
 
In "ne7spaper0 of "date0 you 7ere looking for a ne7 employee 7ith " skill 10 and " 
skill 20 and " skill 30 for "?ob title0. Because I am 7ell prepared to fill this position I 
7ould like to apply for this ?ob. 
 
I recently "description of recent past0 
 
Dy skills are "list of skills0 
 
Eooking for7ard to your response. 
 
Fours Sincerely 
 
 
"Signature0 
 
 
EnclosedI  JKL Eetters of recommendation 
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,:C:N8CPs ;WW<9K;t9C: <ette7 2/T# KCP7se Ke7t9?9K;te  
_bt7e;teB ;WW<9K;t9C:c t7;:s<;teB ?7C8 4e78;:` 
 
"Address of individual0 
 
"Address of firm0 
 
"2ate0 
 
! +o% tit(e * 
 
2ear "Personnel department0 
 
In "ne7spaper0 of "date0 you 7ere looking for a ne7 employee 7ith " skill 10 and " 
skill 20 and " skill 30 for "?ob title0. Because I am 7ell prepared to fill this position I 
7ould like to apply for this ?ob. 
 
I recently "description of recent past0 
 
Dy skills are "list of skills0 
 
I recently finished the course MNeOtverarbeitung PWinWRR2TU at EB WolfbachL Zurich. 
Nhe enclosed course certificate indicates successful completion of this course. 
 
Eooking for7ard to your response. 
 
Fours Sincerely 
 
"Signature0 
 
 
 
EnclosedI  JKL Eetters of recommendationL Jourse certificate 
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'CP7se Ke7t9?9K;te 
 
(Note that “Jürg Heller” does not exist in real life) 
